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THE PEOPLE V. THEIR LEGISLATURE:
PROPOSING THE USE OF RULE 24 AS A
TOOL TO REGULATE THE “TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY” AND ENSURE THE “TRUE
WILL OF THE PEOPLE” IS UPHELD
ADAM SCOTTO†
INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2008, California voters made a landmark
decision that would shake the foundation of minority rights in
America by voting “yes” on Proposition 8.1 Proposition 8 was a
ballot initiative, sponsored by a group called Protect Marriage,
that amended the state’s constitution to ban same-sex marriage.2
Gay marriage proponents responded by filing lawsuits against
the State of California and other state governing bodies and
officials, challenging the initiative on the grounds that
Proposition 8 should not have been allowed on the ballot because
it was a constitutional revision rather than an amendment.3 The
California Supreme Court upheld the ballot initiative against the
challenge to its conformity with the state constitution.4 Shortly
after the California Supreme Court’s decision, gay marriage
proponents filed suit in federal court against the California state

†
St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s University School of
Law; B.A., 2008, Queens College. I would like to thank Professor Sovern for
providing me with invaluable advice throughout the process. I would also like to
thank Bridget for always believing in me, and my mother, Roberta, who made all of
this possible.
1
Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Ban in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A1.
2
Id.
3
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009). In California, the state
constitution can be amended through the ballot initiative process but cannot be
revised. Id. A revision is distinct from an amendment because it represents more of
an overhaul of the constitution than an amendment does. See id. at 61.
4
Id. at 119.
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officials whose duty it was to implement the law, alleging that
the law violates the U.S. Constitution’s due process and equal
protection guarantees.5 That case is still in the appeals process.
Presumably, most state officials did not actively support
Proposition 8, or they would have proposed such an amendment
themselves.6 In addition, the California Supreme Court had
ruled in favor of allowing gay marriage just one year earlier.7
Many of the groups that were involved in sponsoring the
initiative felt like they would be in a position to defend the law
more vigorously than the seemingly adversely interested state
officials and moved to intervene in the federal and state suits in
defense of the law.8 In both cases, given California’s liberal
intervention allowance rules,9 the sponsoring groups were
allowed to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the law.10
This was especially pertinent in the ongoing federal court case,
as state officials had decided not to defend the measure at all.11
This Note considers the outcome in a case where named
state official defendants in a similar claim decline to defend the
suit, and the sponsors of the initiative are not allowed to
intervene. Federal courts are split on the issue of whether to
allow intervention as a matter of right to a ballot sponsor under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 (“Rule 24”), the rule governing
5

See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928–30 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Amendments to the California state constitution must be voted on by the
public but can be put on the ballot by a two-thirds legislative vote. CAL. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 1. Not only did the legislature not propose such an amendment here but the
California State Senate approved a non-binding resolution calling on the California
Supreme Court to overturn Proposition 8. See Patrick McGreevy, Senate Censures
Gay-Marriage Ban, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A5. Governor Schwarzenegger was
an outspoken opponent of Proposition 8 as well. See Michael Rothfield & Tony
Barboza, Governor Backs Gay Marriage; Schwarzenegger Voices Hope that
Proposition 8 Will Be Overturned by Courts as Crowds Continue To Protest, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at B1.
7
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
8
See Proposed Intervenors’ Notice of Motion & Motion To Intervene &
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion To Intervene at 1, Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-2292), 2009 WL
1499309 [hereinfacter Motion to Intervene]; Strauss, 207 P.3d at 69.
9
Intervention in California is governed by section 387 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, which reads almost identically to Rule 24. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 387(b) (West 2009), with FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). The Ninth Circuit, however,
has liberally allowed intervention in similar situations. See Motion To Intervene,
supra note 8, at 6; infra Part II.A.1.
10
See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928; Strauss, 207 P.3d at 69.
11
See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928; Maura Dolan, Gov. Won’t Defend
Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at A4.
6
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intervention.12 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has generally
allowed such sponsors to intervene.13 On the other hand, the
Sixth Circuit recently denied the proposed intervention of the
sponsor of an anti-affirmative action law in a case challenging
the constitutionality of the law,14 where similar concerns existed
about the named defendants’ desire to uphold the law.15 This
Note argues that allowing intervention as a matter of right to
sponsors of ballot initiatives to allow them, rather than the
named defendants, to defend the constitutionality of the passed
law is at odds with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well
as public policy and that disallowing such intervention will have
a prodigious effect on the rights of all.
Part I provides background on the ballot initiative process
and its usage throughout American history, as well as an indepth analysis of the requirements of Rule 24. Part II discusses
the conflicting decisions of the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, as well as the current political controversy surrounding
ballot initiatives. Part III argues that, because of the overall
inadequacy of modern ballot initiatives in capturing the “will of
the people,” and because of the general failure of sponsors to
meet the requirements of Rule 24, an application for intervention
by an initiative’s sponsor should never be granted. Part III
ultimately concludes that a suit brought by any party challenging
the constitutionality of a passed ballot initiative should be used
by the state as a “second-check” on whether the initiative ably
communicates the will of the public on that topic.
I.

BACKGROUND: BALLOT INITIATIVES AND RULE 24

This Part explains the complexities of both ballot initiatives
and Rule 24. First, it will give the reader an idea of what ballot
initiatives and sponsors are, how they originated, and the context
that we see them in now. Then, it will give a general overview of
Rule 24. Finally, it will explain the three main requirements of

12

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
See, e.g., Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d
627, 629–30 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2007).
14
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 777, 784 (6th
Cir. 2007).
15
Id. at 786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13
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Rule 24 to provide the framework upon which petitioning
sponsors’ motions for intervention are analyzed.
A.

History of Ballot Initiatives in America

A ballot initiative is a proposed law that requires voter
approval for enactment.16 An initiative can reach the ballot and
be voted on by the public only after collection of a set number of
signatures of eligible voters.17 The person or group that starts
the initiative process and submits the signatures to the state is
called the sponsor of that initiative.
The initiative process, which is sometimes referred to as
“direct democracy,” originated in the late 1800s as progressives
looked to shake up the “party machine politics” that had
corrupted state and federal legislation.18 The idea was to take
some representative power out of the hands of the establishment
and deliver it back to the public.19 In all, twenty-four states have
adopted the initiative process in some binding capacity.20 Early
on, direct democracy served its purpose quite well. For example,
in Oregon alone, there were initiatives passed for increased
school funding, better working conditions, a corrupt practices act,
a ban on poll taxes, and women’s suffrage.21 Given the “party
machine politics” of the era, it is unlikely such extensive reform
would have been possible without direct democracy.22
16
Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1191, 1194 (2005). Advisory measures can carry no real force, but this Note
focuses on initiatives that create, amend, or repeal a law. See id.
17
The set number varies from state to state. California, for example, requires
signature “by electors equal in number to [five] percent in the case of a statute, and
[eight] percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all
candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election.” CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8(b).
18
Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1192.
19
See id.
20
Todd Donovan & Shawn Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the
American States, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1, 4–7 (Sean Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
21
Oregon Blue Book, Initiative, Referendum, and Recall: 1908–1910,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections11.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
22
In the late nineteenth century, during the post-Civil War, pre-trust-buster
era, large railroad companies and other monopolies were entrenched in political
power through eminent domain, large land grants, and other laws passed seemingly
“in the interest and on the demand of special interests to concentrate wealth and
power in the hands of corporations and trusts.” See THOMAS GOEBEL, A
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1890–1940, at 21
(2002). Direct democracy was a grassroots movement led by disillusioned “agitators”
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Since its early years, direct democracy has ebbed and flowed
throughout the United States. Few ballot measures were used in
the 1920s.23 Usage was popular during the Great Depression,
but slowed considerably after the U.S. entered World War II.24
The initiative process made a strong comeback in the 1970s,
highlighted by California’s controversial anti-tax proposition and
has been prevalent ever since, with recurring themes including
taxes, government spending, environmental protections, gay
rights, abortion, and affirmative action.25
Although, theoretically, anybody can become a sponsor by
proposing an initiative and getting it on the ballot as long as he
or she has enough support, the recent trend has been for
“professional direct democracy firms [to] gather signatures and
shop ballot titles while interest groups spend millions on
advertising and political efforts.”26 This is understandable, as it
is an arduous task for one person or a small group to get what
may amount to hundreds of thousands of signatures in support of
a particular proposal. However, this trend, combined with other
factors, has led to staunch criticism of the initiative process.27
The initiative, so often used as a way to decide a hot-button
issue, has become a hot-button issue itself.
in order to overcome the apparent corruption that existed between the corporations
and the two major parties. See id. at 19–21.
23
Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1196.
24
Id.
25
Marcilynn A. Burke, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Exposing the Failures of
Regulating Land Use Through the Ballot Box, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1453, 1455–
56 (2009).
26
Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1193 (describing this trend nationally). See generally
David McCuan et al., California’s Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and
the Initiative Process, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 20, at 55 (describing this trend in California).
27
See infra Part II.B. Most criticism has involved the way in which initiatives
are procured and the types of initiatives. See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203
(lamenting the corporate media and interest group influence, as well as the trend
towards taking away the rights of minorities); Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining
Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037,
1051–54 (2001) (criticizing the fact that the measures are fixed and unamendable,
take no opposition into account, limit the deliberative options to a “yes” or “no,” and
take advantage of an under-informed electorate). Some have argued that direct
democracy is unconstitutional altogether. See Douglas H. Hsiao, Invisible Cities: The
Constitutional Status of Direct Democracy in a Democratic Republic, 41 DUKE L.J.
1267, 1271 (1992) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 211 (James Madison) (Charles
A. Beard ed., 1948); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4) (arguing that direct democracy violates
both Madisonian philosophy and the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of
government).
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Elements Necessary To Achieve Rule 24 Intervention as a
Matter of Right

In the types of cases that this Note examines—cases in
which the constitutionality of a law is being questioned—the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern intervention.1 Rule 24,
which entitles certain parties to intervene in a lawsuit as a
matter of right, states, in relevant part:
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene
who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated
that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.28

This seemingly complicated rule can essentially be broken down
into three distinct requirements an intervener must satisfy to be
allowed into the lawsuit as a matter of right.29 First, the
proposed intervener must have “a substantial legal interest
in the subject matter of the case.”30 Second, the proposed
intervener’s “ability to protect that interest may be impaired in
the absence of intervention.”31 The third requirement is “that the
parties already before the court may not adequately [protect the
proposed intervener’s] interest.”32
1.

Interest

The proposed intervener must be able to demonstrate “an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of the action.”33 This is sometimes referred to as a “substantial
legal interest,”34 or an interest that is “direct, substantial, and
legally protectable.”35
28

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
This breakdown of the requirements of Rule 24 is set forth by the Sixth
Circuit in Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit
also includes a requirement that the application be timely. Id. at 397.
30
Id. at 398.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
34
See Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 780 (6th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grutter, 188 F.3d at 398).
35
See, e.g., Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840–41 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaiser Coal Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 998
F.2d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Perry Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d
29
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Due to the complicated, somewhat ambiguous language
used, deciding whether the interest requirement has been met is
necessarily a “highly fact-specific determination.”36 Most circuits
draw a somewhat liberal line toward determining that an
interest exists and allowing intervention.37 That being said, the
interest requirement “finds its own limits in the historic
continuity of the subject of intervention.”38
Some concrete examples help to give context to the interest
requirement’s seemingly abstract legal jargon. Cases in which
the interest requirement is easily met include readily identifiable
interests in property or funds,39 cases where the judgment would
have a binding effect on the would-be intervener,40 and cases
where a statutory scheme is being challenged and the proposed
intervener is governed directly by that statutory scheme.41
Examples of the types of cases in which it is more difficult to
determine whether a sufficient interest exists are employment
discrimination actions, civil rights suits, labor disputes, and
environmental litigation, as generally no readily identifiable
interest, binding effect, or directly governing scheme exists.42 In

277, 279 (5th Cir. 1978); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1908.1 (3d ed. 2009).
36
See, e.g., Coal. of Ariz., 100 F.3d at 840–41 (quoting Security Ins. Co. v.
Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
37
See, e.g., Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.1986)) (“Rule 24 is broadly
construed in favor of potential intervenors.”); Nat’l Farm Lines v. Interstate
Commerce Comm’n, 564 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1977) (“Our court has tended to
follow a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention.”).
38
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 405 (1967).
39
A good example of this is a case where a bank was allowed to intervene in a
foreclosure action because it held a note on the property being foreclosed on. See
Lennox Indus. Inc. v. Caicedo Yusti, 172 F.R.D. 617, 621 (D.P.R. 1997).
40
An example of this is a case where a party sought an injunction against a
receiver’s lawyer from filing any suits on behalf of the receiver. See Exch. Nat’l Bank
of Chi. v. Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97, 102 (D. Minn. 1968). The receiver was allowed to
intervene because the receiver’s ability to use counsel of his choice would be bound
by such judgment against his lawyer. See id.
41
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35. An example of such a case can be seen
where several labor unions were contesting sections of Michigan’s Campaign
Finance Act. See Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1244 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Michigan Chamber of Commerce was allowed to intervene in this case because
the Chamber of Commerce was directly regulated by three of the four challenged
provisions of the Act. See id. at 1246–47.
42
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35.
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these cases, the crux of determining whether the interest
requirement has been met is whether the proposed intervener
can show that its particular rights are in jeopardy.43
Perhaps the most instructive way to frame the interest
requirement is in terms of public policy. On this front, “in the
intervention area the ‘interest’ test is primarily a practical guide
to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently
concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due
process.”44 This language implies that the scale may weigh more
heavily in favor of finding the interest requirement to have been
met when there is a strong possibility of separate future lawsuits
by the proposed intervener if denied intervention.45
2.

Effect of the Action on the Interest

If a sufficient interest is found, the proposed intervener must
then prove that it “is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to
protect its interest.”46 This is sometimes couched in the more
simple language of a requirement that the proposed intervener’s
“ability to protect that interest may be impaired in the absence of
intervention.”47
This requirement is the least ambiguous of the three and
the easiest to satisfy.48 Courts will generally consider any
“significant legal effect,” not just the most easily recognizable
43

Id. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 138 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing
intervention where proposed interveners were prospective minority applicants for
admission to a university and nonprofit organization dedicated to preserving higher
educational opportunities for minority students in maintaining the use of race as a
factor in the university’s admissions program, and the suit challenged the
constitutionality of the school’s admissions policy), with Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d
1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying intervention of an anti-abortion lobbyist
organization into a suit challenging a law restricting abortions, on the grounds that
the organization’s interest in the protection of the unborn and its members’
purported interest in adopting children who survive abortions was not “direct and
substantial”).
44
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700
(D.C. Cir. 1967)).
45
Seemingly following this train of thought, the Seventh Circuit has required
that “[t]he interest must be so direct that the applicant would have ‘a right to
maintain a claim for the relief sought.’ ” Keith, 764 F.2d at 1269 (quoting Heyman v.
Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi., 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1980)).
46
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
47
Grutter, 138 F.3d at 398.
48
See, e.g., Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1257 (6th Cir. 1997)
(describing the burden of satisfying this element as “minimal”).

CP_Scotto (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:11 PM

2010]

THE PEOPLE V. THEIR LEGISLATURE

1613

effect.49 Thus, recent cases have held that stare decisis alone
may be sufficient to provide the practical disadvantage
required.50 For example, stare decisis has been enough of a
“significant legal effect” to meet the impairment requirement in
cases where the proposed intervener claims an interest in the
very property and very transaction that is the subject of the main
action.51
Going even further, some courts have held that such
impairment or impediment need not even be “of a strictly legal
nature.”52 Of course, this requirement is not met when the
proposed intervener could protect its interest in a separate
action.53 For example, the Government’s interest in enforcement
of Title IX would be impaired if it was not allowed to intervene
and the plaintiff settled.54
Similarly, the impairment
requirement was satisfied where the grant of an injunction could
prevent the proposed intervener from having the counsel of his
choice in a future action he was planning,55 and a case where
preclusion of a university from considering race as a factor in
admissions could lead to a substantial decline in enrollment of
minority students, some of whom were proposed interveners, also
satisfied the impairment requirement.56 Overall, where the
interest requirement is met, the impairment requirement
generally follows.57

49

See, e.g., Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of
Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978)) (noting that
courts will go beyond considering just the binding effect of res judicata on a potential
intervener in determining whether the applicant’s ability to protect its interest will
be impeded). The most easily recognizable effects are mentioned above. See supra
text accompanying notes 39–41.
50
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1908.2.
51
Id.; see, e.g., Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir.
1967) (“When those coincide, the Court before whom the potential parties in the
second suit must come must itself take the intellectually straight forward, realistic
view that the first decision will in all likelihood be the second and the third and the
last one.”).
52
Coal. of Ariz., 100 F.3d at 844 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, 578 F.2d at
1345).
53
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1908.2.
54
C.D. ex rel. A.B. v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 244 F.R.D. 144, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
55
Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97, 102–03 (D. Minn. 1968).
56
Grutter v. Bollinger, 138 F.3d 394, 399 (6th Cir. 1999).
57
Id.
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Adequacy of Representation

If a sufficient interest and a sufficient impairment are found,
the intervention is to be allowed as of right unless the court is
convinced that representation by the existing parties is
adequate.58 Existing parties will generally be found inadequate
to represent a proposed intervener’s interest where there is
“proof of collusion between the representative and an opposing
party,” where the representative has or represents an interest
adverse to the intervener, or where the representative has failed
in the fulfillment of his duty.59 Some courts have framed this as
a burden on the proposed intervener to show “that the parties
already before the court may not adequately represent the
[proposed intervener’s] interest.”60
The most important factor in determining whether
representation is adequate is the relationship between the
interest of the proposed intervener and the interest of the
present parties.61 If the interest of the proposed intervener is
either adverse to or ignored by the existing parties.62 An example
of an adverse or ignored interest deeming representation
inadequate can be found in a case where plaintiffs sued the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to end racial
discrimination in employment and enrollment in schools
receiving federal subsidies.63 A women’s rights group was
allowed to intervene as of right in that case because a decision
compelling the end of racial discrimination would have required
a severe cut of funds for eliminating sex discrimination.64
On the other end of the spectrum are cases where the
representation is generally deemed adequate. Adequacy is found
where the proposed intervener’s interest is identical to that of the
present parties. Common examples include class actions and
58
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). The language of the rule was changed in 1966, with
the clear suggestion being that the burden of persuasion is now on the existing
parties, not the intervener. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909. Nevertheless,
some courts have continued to place the burden on the proposed intervener.
59
Stadin v. Union Elec. Co., 309 F.2d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 1962). This is not a
comprehensive list of all the ways a representation may be found to be inadequate
but is merely a showing of circumstances that always denote inadequate
representation. 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909.
60
7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909; see also Grutter, 138 F.3d at 397–98.
61
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909.
62
See id.
63
See Adams v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 417, 417–18 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
64
Id. at 418.
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other cases where the existing parties will assert similar
arguments and have the same stated goals of the proposed
intervener.65 Additionally, adequacy is found where the proposed
intervener’s interest is identical to that of the present parties or
where the present party is charged by law with representing the
proposed intervener’s interest. Cases where the present party is
charged by law with representing the proposed intervener’s
interest include representation by administrators, trustees,
fiduciaries, corporations, and school boards.66 Similarly, a state
or local government is presumed to adequately represent the
interests of its citizens.67
The tough cases that can have unpredictable outcomes are
those where the proposed intervener’s interest is similar, but not
identical, to the interest of the existing parties.68 In such cases,
the lynchpin seems to be whether the interest is closer to being
adverse or ignored or closer to being identical.69 Therefore, a
“discriminating appraisal” of the particular facts of the case is
required,70 and the situation is resolved in favor of the proposed
intervener if there is a serious possibility that the representation
may be inadequate.71
II. RECENT CASES AND COMMENTARY ON THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
CONTROVERSY
This Part analyzes the current state of the law and the
problems it has created. Part II.A analyzes the decisions and
arguments proffered by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits for and
against allowing intervention by sponsors of ballot initiatives in
65

See id.
See id.
67
See id.; Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280–81 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that the Attorney General could assert rights of all citizens who
would be affected by a statute permitting prayer in public schools, including the
rights of the proposed intervener religious organization). This presumption is
rebuttable, however, upon a very strong showing of inadequate representation. See
Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that, in a suit to
restrict snowmobiles in a national park because of its effect on wildlife,
representation was inadequate where the government had failed to enforce antisnowmobile regulations several times in the past and the proposed intervener was a
conservation group); 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909.
68
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909.
69
See id.
70
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(quoting 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909).
71
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1909.
66
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suits challenging the constitutionality of a passed law. Part II.B
discusses the current controversy over the use of ballot initiatives
as a lawmaking tool by highlighting two major reasons why
ballot initiatives are not always representative of the actual will
of the public.
A.

The Circuit Split

This Section highlights the conflicting rationales regarding
Rule 24’s application to ballot sponsor intervention. Part II.A.1
examines the two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that
have formed the contemporary basis for measuring the Rule in
ballot sponsor cases. This circuit has construed the Rule’s
“interest” requirement liberally. Part II.A.2 describes the Sixth
Circuit’s break from the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, applying Rule
24 more strictly. Part II.A.3 scrutinizes a recent Ninth Circuit
decision that does not fully comport with either the reasoning
from the earlier Ninth Circuit decision or that of the Sixth
circuit.
1.

The Ninth Circuit

The first of the landmark Ninth Circuit cases, Washington
State Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v.
Spellman,72 was decided in 1982. In Spellman, a public interest
group called Don’t Waste Washington (“DWW”) sponsored a
ballot initiative that prohibited “the transportation and storage
within Washington of radioactive waste produced outside the
state” and “gave permission for the state to enter into an
interstate compact to solve the problem of radioactive waste on a
regional basis.”73 After Washington voters passed the initiative,
the state enacted legislation entering into an interstate
compact.74 A group of radioactive dump sites in Washington that
collected waste from outside the state sued the state of
Washington arguing, inter alia, that the statute was
unconstitutional.75 DWW petitioned to intervene, and the district
court, without discussion, denied its motion.76 The Ninth Circuit

72
73
74
75
76

684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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reversed the denial and allowed intervention.77 The court held
that “DWW, as the public interest group that sponsored the
initiative, was entitled to intervention as a matter of right.”78
The court did not go into whether the proposed intervener had an
interest, whether there would have been an impairment of that
interest had the case been disposed of, or whether the state
adequately represented DWW’s interest. Instead, the court
merely stated that “Rule 24 traditionally has received a liberal
construction in favor of applicants for intervention.”79
The Ninth Circuit decided a second intervention case one
year later in 1983, in Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt. In
Sagebrush, the Idaho Secretary of the Interior, under heavy
lobbying influence from the Audubon Society, a nonprofit public
interest environmental group, established a wildlife conservation
area to protect endangered birds of prey.80 Sagebrush Rebellion,
Inc., a group that opposed the conservation area and instead
urged multiple-use management of the land, sued the Secretary
of the Interior, alleging that the area violated federal land use
laws.81 The Audubon Society sought intervention and the district
court denied the motion.82 The Ninth Circuit reversed.83 The
court held that since Rule 24 “traditionally has received a liberal
construction in favor of applications for intervention” and this
case was analogous to cases where a public interest group sought
intervention in an action challenging the legality of a measure
that it had supported, intervention as of right must be allowed.84
Thus, even though this case did not directly involve a ballot
sponsor, it reinforced the Spellman decision and perhaps gave
even more credence to the Spellman rationale.

77

Id. at 629–30.
Id. at 630.
79
Id. (citing 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1904 (1972)).
80
Id. at 526–27.
81
Id. at 526.
82
Id. at 527.
83
Id.
84
Id. (quoting Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684
F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982)).
78

CP_Scotto (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:11 PM

1618

2.

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1605

The Sixth Circuit

Two recent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of Rule 24 to ballot
sponsors. The first case, Northland Family Planning, Inc. v.
Cox,85 was decided in 2007. In Cox, the Michigan legislature
passed a law banning partial-birth abortion.86 The measure was
proposed to the legislature by a citizen initiative petition.87 A
group called Standing Together to Oppose Partial-Birth-Abortion
(“STTOP”) handled the initiative process.88 STTOP was the
ballot question committee of a group called Right to Life of
Michigan, Inc. and had been formed specifically to promote the
passage of the act.89 Several abortion doctors and health care
facilities sued the state attorney general, arguing that the
restriction was unconstitutional, and STTOP moved to intervene
to defend the law.90 The district court denied STTOP’s motion,91
and the Sixth Circuit upheld the denial.92 The court held that
STTOP only had an ideological interest in the litigation because
the lawsuit did not involve the regulation of STTOP’s conduct in
any respect.93 Also important to the court’s determination was
85

487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007).
Legal Birth Definition Act, P.A. 2004, No. 135, §§ 1–5 (2005) (codified as
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.1081–1085 (West 2010)), invalidated by Cox, 487
F.3d at 339.
87
Cox, 487 F.3d at 327. In a citizen initiative petition in Michigan, the
legislature is presented with a petition after a certain number of signatures are
procured, at which point the legislature can either vote to enact the proposal as is or
refer it to a vote by the electorate. MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9. In this case, the
legislature voted to enact the proposal as is. Cox, 487 F.3d at 327.
88
Cox, 487 F.3d at 328.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
The district court, in its denial of intervention, analogized STTOP’s
“generalized interest in one issue” to cases where “[t]hose supporting a certain
legislation, including legislators, have been denied intervention because individual
legislators who voted for the enactment of certain legislation do not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of an enacted legislation.” Northland Family
Planning, Inc. v. Cox, 394 F. Supp. 2d 978, 989 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (citing Planned
Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998)),
aff’d, 487 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2007). Also important to the district court’s decision was
the fact that “[a]nti-abortion groups are not traditionally permitted to intervene in
constitutional challenges to state and local laws regulating abortion.” Id. (citing
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986)).
92
Cox, 487 F.3d at 327.
93
Id. at 345. The court compared STTOP to the proposed interveners in Grutter,
who were prospective minority applicants for admission to a university in a suit
challenging the constitutionality of the school’s admission policy. Id. (citing Grutter
86
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that STTOP was not a repeat player in similar legislation and
was created specifically for the one ballot initiative.94 The court
further distinguished between this case and cases where the
procedure required to pass a rule, rather than the rule itself, was
being challenged.95 Finally, the court warned that allowing
intervention of public interest groups in similar situations could
lead to “over-politicization of the judicial process.”96
The second of the Sixth Circuit cases, Coalition To Defend
Affirmative Action v. Granholm,97 was decided in 2007, just a few
months after Cox. In Granholm, a ballot initiative was passed
that amended Michigan’s Constitution to outlaw affirmative
action in public education, public employment, and public
contracting.98 The initiative was sponsored by the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative Committee (“MCRI”) and the American Civil
Rights Foundation (“ACRF”), two anti-affirmative action groups
who “were at the forefront of the protracted campaign to adopt
[the proposal] and are committed to ensuring its constitutionality
and timely implementation.”99 Plaintiffs, a number of proaffirmative action public interest groups and minority
individuals, sued Michigan’s Governor as well as several
universities that would be charged with implementing the ban.100
The suit alleged, inter alia, that the prohibition was
unconstitutional.101 MCRI and ACRF sought intervention but
were denied by the district court.102 The Sixth Circuit upheld the
denial.103 Citing its reasoning in Cox, the court held that the
v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Grutter group had a substantial
legal interest because their conduct would be regulated by the legislation. Id.
94
Id. (“[W]here STTOP was created and continues to exist for the purpose of
passing and upholding the Act, its legal interest can be said to be limited to the
passage of the Act rather than the state’s subsequent implementation and
enforcement of it.”).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 346.
97
501 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2007). Granholm was decided in September 2007 while
Cox was decided in June 2007.
98
Id. at 776.
99
Id. at 780.
100
Id. at 778.
101
Id.
102
The district court denied intervention because it found that “[the proposed
interveners] have not asserted that whatever ruling this Court hands down will
have an impact on the vitality of the organizations, subject them to regulation, or
expand or curtail their rights as organizations.” Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action
v. Granholm, 240 F.R.D. 368, 375 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
103
Granholm, 501 F.3d at 779.
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proposed interveners’ “status as organizations involved in the
process leading to the adoption of [the proposal was] insufficient
to provide them with a substantial legal interest in a lawsuit
challenging the validity of those portions of Michigan’s
constitution amended by [the proposal].”104 The court rejected
the proposed interveners’ argument that the litigation affected
them directly because some of their members were Michigan
residents, saying that this amounted to a mere “general
ideological interest . . . shared by the entire Michigan
citizenry.”105
3.

Gonzalez v. Arizona: A Middle Ground

The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Gonzalez v. Arizona,
decided several months before the two Sixth Circuit cases,
further complicates matters.106 This decision is consistent with
the Spellman and Sagebrush precedent in finding a “substantial
legal interest,” yet, unlike in those cases, intervention here was
ultimately denied because the court deemed the representation to
be adequate.107 In Gonzalez, a ballot initiative was passed
requiring all Arizona voters to show identification when they vote
at the polls and to present proof of citizenship for voter
registration.108 A group called “Yes on Proposition 200” had
sponsored the initiative.109 A contingent consisting of several
Arizona residents, community organizations, and Indian tribes
sued the state of Arizona and various state election officials,
104
Id. at 781–82 (citing Northland Family Planning, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323,
346 (6th Cir. 2007)).
105
Id. at 782. A vigorous Granholm dissent sought to follow the Ninth Circuit
precedent and attempted to distinguish Cox on the grounds that this case involved
an initiative that was not enacted by the legislature and that the named defendants
here had explicitly shown that they were not receptive to anti-affirmative action law.
Id. at 784–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
argued that the Governor, who was among the named defendants, had publicly
opposed the ballot initiative and that the named defendants had already
compromised with the plaintiffs and agreed to an unlawful injunction, showing a
strong possibility that they would not be the best parties to defend the suit and thus
strengthening the proposed interveners’ interest. Id. at 786–87.
106
This decision represents a middle ground between the prior Ninth Circuit
rationale and the Sixth Circuit decisions. In particular, the court here interpreted
the “interest” requirement of Rule 24 liberally, yet carefully scrutinized and
ultimately rejected the sponsor’s claim that representation was inadequate. See
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1046.
109
Id. at 1051.
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arguing, inter alia, that the measure was unconstitutional.110
“Yes on Proposition 200” moved to intervene and was denied by
the district court.111 The Ninth Circuit upheld the denial.112
Keeping with the circuit’s tradition and providing more detail
than its prior decisions, the court held that the proposed
intervener had a substantial legal interest that would be
impaired if the action was disposed of.113 In an interesting turn,
however, the court held that “[w]here ‘the government is acting
on behalf of a constituency it represents,’ as it is here, this court
assumes that the government will adequately represent that
constituency”114 and that its prior decision in Sagebrush had
turned on “the lack of any real adversarial relationship between
the plaintiffs and the defendants.”115 The court held that,
because the defendants had not indicated that they were
unwilling or unable to defend the suit and indeed had done so at
every level of the federal courts, there was not a “very compelling
showing” that the defendants would not adequately represent the
proposed intervener’s interest.116
B.

Current Ballot Initiative Controversy

Direct democracy became popular based on the idea that
ballot measures “embody the consent of the governed and
thereby achieve democratic legitimacy without the need for
‘accountability’ that arises from the delegation of lawmaking
authority to an agent of the people.”117 Sometimes, however, the
solution to a problem may end up causing more difficulties than
the original issue. Critics contend that this has been the case
with ballot initiatives, as disparagement of the process and the
societal problems they create seem to increase by the day, to the
point that ballot initiatives no longer seem to be in the public
interest. These criticisms can be divided into two major groups.
The first is that experience with the legislative and initiative
110

Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1051.
112
Id. at 1052.
113
See id.
114
Id. (quoting Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2006)).
115
Id. This statement is somewhat puzzling considering there is no mention of
such lacking by the Sagebrush Court.
116
Id. (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003)).
117
See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1253, 1263 (2009); supra Part I.A.
111
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processes has shown that the legislature is better suited to
lawmaking than the electorate. The second is that special
interest groups have exacerbated the “democratic legitimacy”
problem by commandeering the initiative system and fashioning
it into a tool for minority oppression. This Note later argues that
because of the issues raised by these criticisms, reform is
necessary to temper the influence of ballot initiatives. One
desirable solution is to invariably deny intervention of ballot
sponsors into suits challenging the constitutionality of the passed
law.118
1.

The Electorate’s Suitability to Lawmaking Compared to the
Legislature’s

“A well-functioning democratic system not only aggregates
preferences, it also provides opportunities for refinement of
proposals, informed deliberation, consensus-building, and
compromise.”119 A legislative setting is conducive to these goals,
as representatives from each side with varying constituent
interests must work together to come to a result that all parties
can live with.120 On the other hand, the process by which a ballot
initiative becomes law flies in the face of such goals. The
initiative process is a “battering ram” that bypasses our
fundamental system of checks and balances to achieve a quick
resolution to a hot-button issue.121
First, ballot sponsors in many states have absolute control
over the framing of the measure and how it will be worded on the
ballot.122 Opponents and other interested parties are essentially
excluded from the drafting process, as in many states “[t]here are

118

See discussion infra Part III.
Miller, supra note 27, at 1051.
120
This may be more or less pronounced depending on how much of a majority is
held by a particular party and how many votes are needed, but the overall premise
remains the same because of the process of legislative debate, committee and
subcommittee hearings, votes, and deliberations. See Project Vote Smart,
Government 101: How a Bill Becomes Law, http://www.votesmart.org/resource_
govt101_02.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
121
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1051 (quoting V.O. KEY, JR. & WINSTON W.
CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 458 (1939)).
122
See id. at 1051–52. Some states, however, do have laws allowing the
language of the initiative on the ballot to be reworded by the attorney general or
other state official. See, e.g., Ballotpedia.org, Laws Governing the Initiative Process
in Oregon, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Laws_governing_the_initiative_
process_in_Oregon (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
119
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no open meeting laws, public notice requirements, hearings to
solicit public input, or other guarantees to give the press and
public access to the drafting and editing stages of the initiative
policy-making process.”123 Furthermore, the fact that a voter can
only vote “yes” or “no” and does not have the legislative options of
adding input, amending, or voting for alternate legislation that
will likely lead to an “inaccurate barometer” of the voters’ true
opinions.124 This atmosphere, where opponents have no leverage
to force compromises, incentivizes polarization rather than
consensus building.125
Additionally, the electorate is typically not as knowledgeable
as members of the legislature in terms of policy and thus many
times does not make an informed decision. In fact, political
scientists have for decades almost universally accepted the fact
that most citizens lack even basic political knowledge.126 “If
citizens do not know about the existence of a policy issue, they
will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences on its
most desirable resolution.”127 Indeed, the public tendency with
regard to questions about policy is to simply make up its answers
on the spot due to a lack of a preexisting view on the issue128 and
a complete lack of knowledge about the content of the initiative
123

Miller, supra note 27, at 1052 (commenting on California’s initiative process).
See id. at 1053–54.
125
Id. at 1053 n.48 (“For many initiative campaigns the basic strategy comes
down to two main tasks. First, make the initiative controversial so that the public is
paying attention. Second, define the sides so you are the good guys and the other
side is evil incarnate.” (quoting JIM SCHULTZ, THE INITIATIVE COOKBOOK: RECIPES
AND STORIES FROM CALIFORNIA’S BALLOT WARS 7 (1996))).
126
Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1266 n.51 (“The claim that citizens lack
political information has a long and respected history.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA 17 (1998))); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy
Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH 45, 47 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (“It is an
article of faith among political scientists that citizens are woefully uninformed about
politics, and scholars have rarely resorted to understatement in characterizing the
public’s knowledge gaps.”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2004) (“The most important
point established in some five decades of political knowledge research is that the
majority of American citizens lack even basic political knowledge.”).
127
Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1267.
128
See id. at 1267–68. Political scientist John R. Zaller formulated this assertion
based on empirical evidence from several surveys and experiments regarding
“seemingly irreverent features of questionnaire design [that] affect the responses
given.” See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 77 (1992).
124
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measure.129 The outcome is that, in many cases, the result of
ballot questions depends on how the issue is framed or how the
question is posed.130 These variables are generally controlled by
the ballot sponsor.131
Critics also contend that the lack of informed deliberation
and consensus building debate has created an atmosphere
conducive to further problems. Because the only time ballot
sponsors are generally forced to make any kind of statement
about their proposal is upon submission to the state for
certification, they can easily avoid both being pinned down to a
specific purpose and answering opponent’s questions.132 Thus,
ballot sponsors can be as broad and ambiguous as possible in
order to control the message to the electorate.133 This allows for
“bait-and-switch” scenarios, where a ballot proposal seems
moderate leading up to the election yet on enactment has wide
ranging partisan collateral consequences.134 Combined with
other societal issues borne out of this atmosphere,135 the
legislature is better suited to lawmaking than the voting
public.136
Proponents of direct democracy contend that although these
concerns may exist, they pale in comparison to both the

129
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1053 (citing Elisabeth R. Gerber, Prospects for
Reforming the Initiative Process, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY?: THE BATTLE OVER
INITIATIVES IN AMERICA (Larry J. Sabato et al. eds., 2001); see also DAVID MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
139–44 (1984).
130
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1053–54.
131
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
132
See Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 17, 35–39 (commenting on Michigan’s initiative process).
133
See id. at 35–38.
134
Id. Glen Staszewski, an Associate Professor at Michigan State University
College of Law, specifically writes about a 2004 ballot initiative that purported only
to define marriage as “a union between husband and wife” but ended up having the
legal effect of stopping employers from providing domestic benefits on enactment, a
consequence that was denied or ignored by the sponsors leading up to the vote. Id. at
21–29.
135
See Jennifer Steinhauer, Lead Judge Denounces State’s Glut of Measures,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A23 (quoting California Supreme Court Chief Justice
Ronald M. George as saying that “California’s lawmakers, and the state itself, have
been placed in a fiscal straitjacket by a steep two-thirds-vote requirement—imposed
at the ballot box—for raising taxes,” and “Frequent amendments—coupled with the
implicit threat of more in the future—have rendered our state government
dysfunctional, at least in times of severe economic decline.”).
136
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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corruption in legislative government137 and the impediment to
free speech that would occur if ballot initiatives were
precluded.138 Others argue that these issues can be resolved
through tweaks in the ballot initiative system involving
increased regulation and oversight.139
2.

The Influence of Special Interests in the Initiative Process

Currently, one of the biggest criticisms of ballot initiatives is
that big money special interest groups have managed to wedge
themselves to the forefront of what is generally thought to be
“lawmaking by the people.” Ballot sponsors typically represent
particular special interests or are “multimillionaires who seek to
influence public policy on their pet issues.”140 They lead the way
in each stage of the initiative process, from conceiving of the
measure and drafting it to obtaining the signatures, advertising
it, and in some circuits, defending the law in subsequent
suits after passage.141 In most cases, professional members of
the “initiative industry” are also used as consultants, mostly
for promotion, advertising, and “spin.”142 Professional “bountyhunters” gather signatures, getting paid up to $2.50 per name.143
The first consequence of this scheme is that it is very
costly.144 Critics assert that this cost has essentially driven “the
people” out of the process altogether, as most ordinary citizens do
not have the time and funds required for such an endeavor.145
137

See GOEBEL, supra note 22, at 22; Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1192.
See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 278–79 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting
that subject matter restrictions on ballot initiative content that serve no important
state interest would impermissibly burden protected speech). This Note is concerned
less with the constitutional argument and more with the idea proffered by initiative
proponents that the process represents the “will of the people” and thus should not
be restricted. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and
Applying the Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 412–20
(2003).
139
See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1230–34.
140
See Staszewski, supra note 138, at 421.
141
See Staszewski, supra 132, at 34–35.
142
Id.
143
See Staszewski, supra note 138, at 425.
144
See id. at 421; Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203–04; Miller, supra note 27, at
1058.
145
See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203–04; Miller, supra note 27, at 1058–59;
Staszewski, supra note 138, at 420; id. at 426 (“Commentators have also recognized
that ‘money increasingly appears to be a necessary condition’ for waging a successful
ballot campaign.” (quoting Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct
Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (1999))).
138
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Additionally, money has been even more influential in defeating
those few proposals that are “initiated by ad hoc groupings of
concerned citizens.”146 Indeed, opponents of an initiative win
eighty percent of the time when they outspend proponents.147 Big
money interests have also used a tactic called a counter
initiative, placing a competing initiative on the ballot using
similar yet more favorable language in order to confuse the voter
into rejecting both proposals.148
According to critics, another consequence of a system led by
special interests is that the public has become a mere pawn in
“lawmaking by the people.”149 One example is the degradation of
the signature requirement. While the signature requirement
was originally imposed to ensure sufficient public support for a
measure and to weed out frivolous proposals, it has now
seemingly lost its teeth. It has become common practice for
signature gatherers to encourage registered voters to sign in
order to “let the people decide” without encouraging them to even
read the measure, let alone engage in substantial discourse over
whether it should be placed on the ballot.150 Another example is
the way that big money interests conduct advertising and
lobbying. They typically bombard the electorate with discourse

146

See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT
ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 251 (1987)). This fact has been well
documented, and examples include opponents of universal healthcare in Oregon
beating an initiative by outspending proponents thirty-two to one, opponents of
required labeling of genetically modified foods beating such initiative by outspending
proponents forty to one, Montana mining interests beating an environmental
initiative by spending nine dollars per vote, and Arizona gambling interests
defeating a measure by outspending proponents 364 to one. Id. at 1205.
147
Id.
148
See id. (“In 1988, Californians faced five auto insurance and tort initiatives:
two sponsored by consumer groups and trial lawyers, and three counter-initiatives
sponsored by the insurance industry. After the then-most expensive campaign in
state history, voters rejected all but one of the initiatives.”); Staszewski, supra note
138, at 429.
149
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1058–59. This coincides with the fact that voters
are generally powerless to shape or express their true opinions about a particular
measure. See id.; discussion supra Part II.B.1.
150
Staszewski, supra note 138, at 424–25 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE
POWER OF MONEY 54 (2000)).
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through print media, radio, and television in a “simplistic,
partisan, and sometimes misleading fashion.”151
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the current way
in which initiatives are commonly procured is the ability of the
majority to use initiatives to take away minority rights. “When it
comes to laws that discriminate against minorities, initiatives
can easily play to popular prejudices,”152 as a simple majority will
win out over even the most stringent minority. Critics of direct
democracy argue that the lack of checks and balances, combined
with the free reign of special interest groups, have led to such
practices.153 Recent examples in California alone include the
aforementioned Proposition 8,154 as well as initiatives to take
away rights of racial minorities,155 illegal immigrants, and
criminal defendants.156
Taken as a whole, these developments suggest that the
arguments of those supporting ballot initiatives—that initiatives
151
Id. at 428 (citing BRODER, supra note 150, at 52) (describing the initiative
industry as “a huge industry devoted to the manipulation of public opinion”); see also
CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 254 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining that
campaign advertising in ballot contests has developed “a reputation for innuendo,
deception and exaggeration”); ZISK, supra note 146, at 264 (finding that ballot
campaign advertisements are “simplistic” at best and “deceptive” at worst); Julian
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1517 (1990)
(claiming that “[i]llustrations of deceptive advertising and sloganeering abound” in
ballot campaigns); Phillip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 441 (1998) (claiming that a “largely unmotivated and
unaccountable electorate is much more prone to influence by campaigns based on
fear and misunderstanding, if not outright misrepresentation”); Becky Kruse,
Comment, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads
Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 147–50 (2001)
(criticizing the use of “increasingly sophisticated, often misleading ads” in ballot
campaigns and providing several notable examples); Daniel H. Lowenstein,
Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice
Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 570 (1982) (indicating that
ballot campaigns are “marked by gross exaggeration, distortion, and outright
deception”); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas
in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 131 (1995) (recognizing that advertising in
initiative campaigns is “avowedly partisan and intended to persuade rather than
inform”).
152
Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1209.
153
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1056–57.
154
See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009).
155
See Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 777, 784
(6th Cir. 2007).
156
See Miller, supra note 27, at 1056–57.
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represents the freely expressed “will of the people” and are
necessary due to corruptive legislatures—no longer apply.157
Rather than the “will of the people,” critics contend that ballot
initiatives have essentially become the “will of the sponsor,” and
the legislatures, while possibly still corrupted by lobbying
influence,158 are no longer engaged in the type of “party machine
politics” for which initiatives were originally created.159 Even
taking current lobbying into account, it seems the public
manipulation involved in the initiative process may be a greater
evil,160 especially when coupled with the inherent disadvantage in
lawmaking by the electorate discussed above.161 These problems
have made it increasingly clear that reform is needed.
III. DENIAL OF INTERVENTION AS A JUDICIALLY SOUND SOLUTION
This Note maintains that reform is necessary to curb some of
the problems that critics of ballot initiatives have identified. One
possible solution to the ballot initiative problem is to invariably
deny intervention of ballot sponsors into suits challenging the
constitutionality of the passed law. This small step will prevent
abuse by creating a “second-check” on ballot initiatives and
providing for a more honest and intelligent deliberation. Section
A contends that such denial is in full conformity with Rule 24
because ballot sponsors do not meet the three requirements for
intervention. Section B examines the possible ramifications of

157

See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Rebecca L. Anderson, The Rules in the Owners’ Box: Lobbying
Regulations in State Legislatures, 40 URB. LAW. 375, 406 (2008). But see James M.
Demarco, Note, Lobbying the Legislature in the Republic: Why Lobbying Reform Is
Unimportant, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 599, 612–17 (1994).
159
The entrenchment of large railroad companies and other monopolies in
government was considerably lessened by the trust-buster era. See GOEBEL, supra
note 22, at 119 (“Corporations might often use illicit means in their quest for
monopolistic control over a particular industry; they rarely, however, had to resort to
those direct subsidies that had so troubled nineteenth-century antimonopolists.”).
Furthermore, even assuming that monied interests still have a large influence in
government currently, the sources provided in this Section show that the monied
interests now have perhaps an even greater influence in initiative law due to their
ability to control the process. In other words, initiatives are no longer a grassroots
cure to legislative corruption. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
160
See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1203–04 (describing a modern trend in
California towards lobbyists spending more money on influencing voters on ballot
initiatives than on influencing state legislators).
161
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
158

CP_Scotto (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:11 PM

2010]

THE PEOPLE V. THEIR LEGISLATURE

1629

such denial and identifies recourse available to ballot initiative
proponents.
A.

Ballot Sponsors Do Not Meet Rule 24’s Interest Requirement

As explained above, any attempted intervention in a suit
governed by federal law must be analyzed through the lens of the
requirements of Rule 24.162 If the proposed intervener does not
meet each of the requirements, then intervention cannot be
granted as a matter of right.163 A party proposing to intervene
solely based on the fact that it sponsored the initiative at issue
fails to meet the interest requirement of Rule 24 and thus cannot
be granted intervention as of right.
No compelling argument has yet been made that a
group attempting to intervene in a suit challenging the
constitutionality of a law it brought to the ballot has any interest
that is “direct, substantial, and legally protectable.”164 The Ninth
Circuit decisions granting intervener in such cases certainly did
not make one. The Spellman and Sagebrush courts stated,
rather conclusory, that the ballot sponsor in each case was
entitled to intervention “as the public interest group that
sponsored the initiative” because “Rule 24 traditionally has
received a liberal construction in favor of applicants for
intervention.”165
Compare this bare-bones analysis with that of the Sixth
Circuit. The Northland and Granholm courts measured the
interest requirement through a number of factors, similar to the
ones discussed above.166 They took into account whether the
proposed intervener’s conduct was being regulated in any respect
by the impending litigation,167 whether the group was a major
player regarding the current issue or an initiative-centered
group,168 and whether the law itself was being challenged rather

162

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
164
See sources cited supra note 35.
165
Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630
(9th Cir. 1982); see also Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th
Cir. 1983) (quoting Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630).
166
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
167
See Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 345 (6th
Cir. 2007).
168
See id.
163
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than the way the initiative came to the ballot.169 It was through
a thorough analysis of all these factors that the those courts
ultimately decided that the “status as organizations involved in
the process leading to the adoption of [a proposal] is insufficient
to provide them with a substantial legal interest in a lawsuit
challenging the validity of those portions of Michigan’s
constitution amended by [a proposal].”170
Not only are the Sixth Circuit decisions more thoroughly
reasoned than the Ninth Circuit’s decisions but an analysis of
prior case law through the interest lens yields the same result.
In ballot sponsor cases, the proposed intervener has no readily
identifiable interest in property or funds,171 and the judgment
would have no more binding effect on the would-be intervener
than it would on every other citizen in the jurisdiction.172 The
proposed intervener cannot, just by the virtue of having
sponsored the ballot initiative at issue, show that its particular

169

See id.
Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Cox, 487 F.3d at 346). The dissent in Granholm argued that an interest
does in fact exist but couched its argument in an analysis of the adequacy of the
representation. Id. at 784–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[T]he possibility of conflict creates a substantial interest.”).
171
The mere fact that a ballot sponsor has spent a large amount of money to
advocate for the initiative being challenged and does not want that money to have
been spent for naught, does not give it a direct interest in defending the
constitutionality of the law. Cf. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1270 (7th Cir. 1985)
In an America whose freedom is secured by its ever vigilant guard on the
openness of its “marketplace of ideas,” [an anti-abortion lobbying company]
is encouraged to thrive, and to speak, lobby, promote, and persuade, so that
its principles may become, if it is the will of the majority, the law of the
land. Such a priceless right to free expression, however, does not also
suggest that [the lobbyist] has a right to intervene in every lawsuit
involving abortion rights, or to forever defend statutes it helped to enact.
Rule 24(a) precludes a conception of lawsuits, even “public law” suits, as
necessary forums for such public policy debates.
Id.; Resort Timeshare Resales, Inc. v. Stuart, 764 F. Supp. 1495, 1499 (S.D. Fla.
1991). Based on the Keith Court’s reasoning then, any money spent by the ballot
sponsor is an exercise of free expression, not a guarantee that the sponsor will see
results in the form of a passed law. Furthermore, in the type of suits this Note
addresses, the issue is the constitutionality of the law, not the funds spent by any
party.
172
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35.
170
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rights are in jeopardy.173 Indeed, absent other circumstances, the
only interest a ballot sponsor has in the litigation is a purely
ideological one.174
Finally, the ballot sponsor’s interest can be looked at through
the public policy of efficiency that the interest requirement was
partially designed to uphold: “disposing of lawsuits by involving
as many . . . persons as is compatible with efficiency and due
process.”175 Through this lens, the sponsor has no substantial
interest either. Since on its own, the sponsor would have no
claim for relief, denying intervention does not damage the public
policy of the avoidance of future lawsuits.176 Since allowing
intervention to ballot sponsors as a matter of right would not
advance any of the policies for which the interest requirement
was created and would contradict the language and prior
examples of the requirement, such intervention should be
invariably denied.
Although failure to satisfy the interest requirement
generally precludes consideration of any of the other elements of
Rule 24,177 a ballot sponsor arguably also fails to meet Rule 24’s
third requirement, inadequacy of representation, because
representation by the existing parties would be adequate.178 The
173

See sources cited supra note 43.
Granholm, 501 F.3d at 782 (“Where . . . an organization has only a general
ideological interest in the lawsuit—like seeing that the government zealously
enforces some piece of legislation that the organization supports—and the lawsuit
does not involve the regulation of the organization’s conduct, without more, such an
organization’s interest in the lawsuit cannot be deemed substantial.”).
175
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694,
700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
176
Indeed, there can be no suit maintained for ideological relief. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1.
177
See, e.g., Granholm, 501 F.3d at 780; 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35,
§ 1908.2 (“If an interest sufficient to satisfy Rule 24(a) is found, it is then necessary to
decide whether the would-be intervener ‘is so situated that disposing of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its
interest.’ ” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); id. § 1909 (“[Rule 24] allows a
person who has an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject matter of
the action and who is so situated that disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest to intervene of right
‘unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.’ ” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24)).
178
Rule 24’s second requirement—that the proposed intervener “is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant’s ability to protect that interest”—would likely be satisfied if the ballot
sponsor was found to have a sufficient interest, as it is a “minimal” standard. See,
e.g., Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997).
174
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sponsor’s ideological interest can be framed one of two ways:
Either the sponsor is interested in upholding its own beliefs179 or
feels that it must uphold the “will of the public.”180 The sponsor’s
interest in upholding its own beliefs is the main interest
addressed by the Sixth Circuit and is insubstantial for the
reasons described above.181 Even if “upholding the will of the
people” could possibly be considered a “direct, substantial, and
legally protectable” interest rather than an ideological one, based
on the problems of ballot initiatives in both their influence by
special interests and their lawmaking deficiency, it is clear that
the named defendants in any suit regarding the constitutionality
of a law would be better suited to represent the “will of the
people” than the ballot sponsor would be.182 Thus, the existing
parties to the suit would adequately represent that interest, and
ballot sponsors would not have a leg to stand on in this respect.
B.

Intervener’s “Second-Check” as a Solution to the Ballot
Initiative Problem

The denial of the intervention of ballot sponsors in all cases
in which the constitutionality of a passed initiative is challenged
is not only consistent with Rule 24 but will allow the named
defendant to conduct a “second check” as to whether the ballot
initiative is truly in the public interest. The defendant will then
have the power to decide whether the law should be upheld.
Courts have denied intervention to a ballot sponsor on the basis
that “[w]here ‘the government is acting on behalf of a
constituency it represents’ . . . [the] court assumes that the

179

See id. at 1246.
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 33–34 & 34 n.4, Granholm, 501 F.3d 775
(No. 06-2656), 2007 WL 5107939 [hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief] (arguing
that the proposed interveners had a substantial interest in part because “the people
themselves are the legislators” in this case and have “taken the trouble to organize
into public interest groups to act as ‘vital participants in the democratic process’ ”).
181
See sources cited supra notes 167–74 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
the sponsor’s interest in upholding the “will of the people” is insubstantial as well, as
even if ballot initiatives did represent the true “will of the people,” sponsors would
still have to find a way to get around the fact that this interest was ideological
rather than “direct, substantial, and legally protectable.” The proposed interveners
in Granholm attempted to do so by analogizing to legislator intervention to defend
laws in suits against the executive branch. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra
note 180, at 33–34.
182
See discussion supra Part II.B.1–2.
180
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government will adequately represent that constituency.”183
Similarly, they have also denied intervention because the
defendants had not indicated that they were unwilling or unable
to defend the suit and indeed had defended it at every level of the
federal courts. There was not a “very compelling showing” that
the defendants would not adequately represent the proposed
intervener’s interest.184 This analysis is not objectionable, but it
assumes that the ballot sponsor has met the interest
requirement.
Following the argument that the lone fact that the proposed
intervener is a ballot sponsor cannot satisfy the interest
requirement,185 there is no reason why the named defendants
need to show that they are willing to zealously defend the suit or
represent any interest that the proposed intervener purports to
have.186 If the named defendant—whether it be the state, the
state attorney general, the governor, or a member of the state
legislature—decides, upon an evaluation of the initiative itself
and the way it was procured, that it does not truly represent the
will of the people, then the named defendant should be allowed to
choose not to vigorously defend the initiative and essentially
concede the law’s unconstitutionality to the initiative’s
challengers.
The named defendant has great incentive to ascertain the
will of the public because, operating under the assumption that
at least some of the named defendants in each case are elected
officials,187 identifying the will of the people may well determine
the longevity of his or her political life.188 Theoretically, the
failure to defend a ballot initiative that the electorate truly
supported would be political suicide, while the failure to defend
an initiative that was based on manipulation of the public by a
single special interest group would have little negative political

183
See Gonzales v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Prete v.
Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2006)).
184
Id. (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003)).
185
See discussion supra Part III.A.
186
See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 35, § 1904.
187
This was the situation in each of the cases discussed in this Note. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
188
The fact that politicians and judges have been reluctant to go against ballot
initiatives for fear of being voted out of office for having rejected the “will of the
people” is well documented. See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1239.

CP_Scotto (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:11 PM

1634

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1605

ramification.189 In any event, the mere fact that a further review
of the procedure was being conducted, and the fact that the
named defendants yielded such power free from the intervention
of the ballot sponsor, would promote more honest preelection
debate as well as weed out ballot initiatives that did not enact
the true will of the people.190
Since the named defendant has such incentive to ascertain
the will of the people in order to make a judgment on the
initiative, he or she should look to the problems that exist with
initiatives and proposals that have been made for reform to set a
framework for analysis of the particular initiative at issue. In
terms of ensuring initiatives are representative of the public will,
the main goal that reform proposals have focused on is increasing
public discourse and political debate on initiatives.191 Another
189
In this situation, if the elected official believes that the public truly did not
want the initiative passed in the first place, he can decline to defend with little risk
of being voted out of office based on that decision. If he believes the electorate truly
did want the law, he will fear political accountability for his actions and thus feel a
duty to defend the law. Of course, one decision does not always make or break a
politician’s reelection, but elected officials do have a duty to uphold the wishes of
their constituents, and elected officials often make decisions based on how they
believe the electorate will react. See Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1275 (“[P]olitical
scientists have argued that the electorate’s lack of information about politics can be
overcome by the fact that elected officials must anticipate the preferences of their
constituents to avoid making decisions that could be used against them in future
elections . . . . [T]his phenomenon does exist and it may help the electorate exercise
some control over policy discretion without engaging in vigilant oversight of public
officials . . . .”). In the rare potential event of a case where the named defendant has
no reason to care what the electorate thinks because he or she will not be running
for reelection—perhaps due to term limits, retirement, et cetera—there are two
possible scenarios. The named defendant may agree with the initiative that was
passed, at which point he or she would defend it wholeheartedly. The other scenario
is that the named defendant has a personal disagreement with the initiative and no
real incentive to ascertain the true will of the public. In the event of the second
scenario, it seems that the named defendant would have free reign to defeat the law,
and the only recourse for the public or the ballot sponsors would be to pass a similar
initiative again after the particular politician’s term had expired. Still, this would
seemingly be a rare occasion, does include eventual recourse, and is not unlike the
situation of a lack of public accountability faced by “lame duck” politicians in the
normal legislative context. See, e.g., Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1269.
190
Cf. sources cited infra note 191.
191
See Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1245–46 (arguing that voter education, and
thus public discourse, through pamphlets and transparency of funding are necessary
reforms); Miller, supra note 27, at 1073; Staszewski, supra note 132, at 58–59
(arguing that judges holding ballot sponsors to statements they made during the
campaign would curtail manipulation of the voters and lead to more honest public
debate about the issues); Staszewski, supra note 138, at 453–54 (arguing that ballot
sponsors should be held to the same “reasoned decisionmaking” standard as
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heavily proposed reform in a similar vein has been ensuring that
the people are not confused about the language of the initiative
and strongly support the initiative as it is to be carried out.192
These two reforms should form the bedrock for a named
defendant to approach a decision as to whether or not a ballot
initiative represents the will of the public.193
Sponsors of ballot initiatives are not without recourse. If the
initiative is truly in the public interest, the named defendant will
either defend the law to the best of his or her ability or risk
political backlash, at which point the climate would be more ripe
for such change.194 There are generally few, if any, limitations on
the number of initiatives a sponsor can propose, so the sponsor, if
need be, could go through the process again at that time with a
higher likelihood of success.195 Furthermore, the court could, at
its discretion, allow a ballot sponsor to file briefs as amicus
curiae on behalf of defending the law’s constitutionality.196 While
the named defendants would still have full autonomy in deciding
how to proceed, this would at least give further voice to the
administrative law bodies, which would create an incentive for sponsors to take into
account all important aspects of the problem, offer explanations in sync with
evidence in the official lawmaking record, and respond in a cogent fashion to public
comments); cf. Staszewski, supra note 117, at 1324–25 (advocating for a judicially
reviewable requirement that legislators provide reasons for they way they vote on
various bills, arguing that this would provide for a more well-reasoned and debated
political process).
192
See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1245 (arguing in favor of supermajority
and successive-vote requirements in order to weed out narrow majorities and make
sure the will of the public is strong); Miller, supra note 27, at 1074–78 (discussing
single-subject rules as a way to keep the public from being manipulated or confused
by voting for two policies at once).
193
Indeed, the hope would be that using such criteria would create an incentive
for ballot sponsors to adopt such reforms in order to prove that their initiative truly
represents the will of the people. See sources cited supra note 191.
194
Theoretically, a majority of the electorate being unhappy with their elected
officials over such a move could either effect change on that issue through public
debate, protests, communication with the official’s office, et cetera, or through voting
that official out of office in favor of one who is more receptive to the type of change
being sought. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (1998) (“The vast majority of theorists have failed to
challenge [Alexander] Bickel’s basic assumption, that political accountability is the
sine qua non of legitimacy in government action.”).
195
If there were such limits, it would be difficult for a professional initiative
industry to exist. See Caroline J. Tolbert et al., Election Law and Rules for Using
Initiatives, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 20, at 27, 34–37 (discussing the professional initiative industry).
196
See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
COMMENTARY 24 (2009).
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sponsor’s concerns.197 These alternatives, while not perfect,
provide adequate recourse for sponsors upon denial of
intervention.
Invariably denying intervention as of right to ballot sponsors
accomplishes the goals of reform as effectively as any other
proposal and is simpler to enact than other proposals. After all,
merely following the intended rationale of Rule 24 can create this
reform.198 Some proposals attempt to institute new rules, placing
procedural limitations on ballot initiatives, which would have to
be done legislatively in each state.199 Other proposals suggest
changing the way substantive judicial review of ballot initiatives
is conducted, which could create constitutional issues.200 Denying
intervention as of right to ballot sponsors would create countrywide reform, accomplish the same goals, and could be instituted
by merely following the rationale intended by Rule 24.201
CONCLUSION
As ballot initiatives continue to grow in popularity and
criticism of the initiative process grows stronger, the issue of
whether to allow sponsors to intervene to defend laws that they
bring to passage has become an increasingly important one. In
attempting to find a solution to the circuit court split that is not
only consistent with the history of Rule 24 but affects societal
change as well, this Note argues that ballot sponsors should
invariably be denied intervention as a matter of right in cases in
which the constitutionality of the passed law is challenged. This
plan would incentivize ballot sponsors to be more truthful with
the public, swing the balance of power from special interests
back to the legislature, and ensure that recognizing the true will
of the people is the first priority. Furthermore, this could be
197
See Liberty Res., Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 395 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209 (E.D.
Pa. 2005) (describing the ways in which amicus briefs can aid the court’s
understanding of the litigation).
198
See discussion supra Part III.A.
199
See, e.g., Hoesly, supra note 16, at 1230–34. Some would even need to be
effected, ironically, through other ballot initiatives. See id. at 1247.
200
Judicial review of ballot initiatives to decide whether the initiative has
upheld the will of the people may conflict with the constitutional requirement that a
federal court can only decide “cases” and “controversies,” rather than political
questions. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; cf. Cudahy Junior Chamber of
Commerce v. Quirk, 165 N.W.2d 116, 119–20 (Wis. 1969); 16B AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE § 641 (2d ed. 2010).
201
See discussion supra Part III.A.
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accomplished with little cost to the legal community, as it merely
involves following the most rational interpretation of Rule 24.
Consider again the case of Proposition 8 in California. If the
Ninth Circuit denied intervention as prescribed in this Note,
Governor Schwarzenegger and other named defendants would
have had the power to decide whether the passed law banning
gay marriage would be defended. The named defendants would
have been forced to consider the true will of the people before
deciding whether and how vigorously to defend the suit. The
looming specter of such a decision would have forced the ballot
sponsors to engage in more honest and robust public debate on
the issue and would have perhaps reduced it to a vote based less
on fear and prejudice. In the end, the result may or may not
have ended up the same, with a strongly defended lawsuit in the
hands of the federal courts, but the “second-check” forced by the
upholding of Rule 24’s principles would make for a more
democratic means and a more educated, informed, and
empowered electorate.

